Contract coordination for green logistics capabilities involving the logistics service demand side

Zhigang Song, Xiaoyan Wang

School of Management Engineering, Zhengzhou University of Aeronautics, Zhengzhou, Henan 450046, China

Abstract


In order to study how to effectively green the logistics capability, we establish a Stackelberg game model of logistics service demand side and logistics service provider. Taking the logistics service provider as the leading factor, this paper analyzes the coordination effect of revenue-sharing contract, cost-sharing contract and combination contract of revenue-sharing contract and cost-sharing contract on the enthusiasm of logistics service providers to rebuild green logistics capability. At the same time, the impact of different contracts on the wholesale price of unit logistics capacity, the price of unit products and the enforceability of the combination contract are discussed. The research results show that the single contract cannot achieve the optimal green level of logistics capability, the combination contract can effectively coordinate the green level of logistics capability and the wholesale price of logistics capacity and the market price of products have been improved. However, the combination contract is unfavorable to the profit of the demand side of the logistics service, and the government financial subsidy is needed to promote the execution of the combination contract.

Keywords


environment; logistics capability; service supply chain

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